Questões de Inglês

Leia a chamada e o título de uma matéria do The Economist, acompanhados da nota do Editor, para responder às questão.

Why are Latin American workers so stringly unproductive?

    Editor’s note (June 9th): The original headline in this article attracted criticism for the phrase “A land of useless workers”. We have changed it to make clear that we are analysing the social and economic costs of low productivity. Our aim is to draw attention to the structural causes of low average labour productivity in Latin American countries, including powerful oligopolies that mute competition and a large informal sector which forces many businesses to remain subscale. As the article makes clear, all of this is beyond the control of individual Latin Americans, whose living standards have suffered. We end with a call for better policymaking.

(www.economist.com, 09.06.2023. Adaptado.)

Leia a chamada e o título de uma matéria do The Economist, acompanhados da nota do Editor, para responder às questão.

Why are Latin American workers so stringly unproductive?

    Editor’s note (June 9th): The original headline in this article attracted criticism for the phrase “A land of useless workers”. We have changed it to make clear that we are analysing the social and economic costs of low productivity. Our aim is to draw attention to the structural causes of low average labour productivity in Latin American countries, including powerful oligopolies that mute competition and a large informal sector which forces many businesses to remain subscale. As the article makes clear, all of this is beyond the control of individual Latin Americans, whose living standards have suffered. We end with a call for better policymaking.

(www.economist.com, 09.06.2023. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder à questão.

The great global baby bust is under way

    Across the world, birth rates are declining more rapidly than expected. That worries retired people and policymakers. In 2010, there were 98 nations and territories with fertility rates below 2.1 (known as the replacement rate) according to the United Nations. In 2021, that number had risen to 124, or more than half the countries for which data were available. The world’s 15 largest economies all have fertility rates below the replacement rate.

    As the proportion of children declines, average ages rise, particularly as old people live longer (though the rise in longevity has slowed in recent years: in Britain lifespans are flatlining and in America they are falling). Some long-running demographic trends are changing, too. Educated women have for decades tended to have fewer children. Nevertheless, fertility among the less educated is now falling.

China, population aged 21-30

    All of this poses a huge economic challenge. In parts of the world where birth rates were already low, the shortfall of young employees, who are needed to subsidise the retired, will be felt intensely. In China, the number of workers aged between 21 and 30 has already declined from 232 million in 2012, to 181 million in 2021. By the mid-2050s the United Nations forecasts there will be fewer than 100 million (see chart). China’s one-child — and later two-child — policy has contributed to the country’s decline in young workers. Recent history has shown that it is much more difficult to raise fertility levels than it is to crush them in the first place.

(www.economist.com, 14.06.2023. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder à questão.

The great global baby bust is under way

    Across the world, birth rates are declining more rapidly than expected. That worries retired people and policymakers. In 2010, there were 98 nations and territories with fertility rates below 2.1 (known as the replacement rate) according to the United Nations. In 2021, that number had risen to 124, or more than half the countries for which data were available. The world’s 15 largest economies all have fertility rates below the replacement rate.

    As the proportion of children declines, average ages rise, particularly as old people live longer (though the rise in longevity has slowed in recent years: in Britain lifespans are flatlining and in America they are falling). Some long-running demographic trends are changing, too. Educated women have for decades tended to have fewer children. Nevertheless, fertility among the less educated is now falling.

China, population aged 21-30

    All of this poses a huge economic challenge. In parts of the world where birth rates were already low, the shortfall of young employees, who are needed to subsidise the retired, will be felt intensely. In China, the number of workers aged between 21 and 30 has already declined from 232 million in 2012, to 181 million in 2021. By the mid-2050s the United Nations forecasts there will be fewer than 100 million (see chart). China’s one-child — and later two-child — policy has contributed to the country’s decline in young workers. Recent history has shown that it is much more difficult to raise fertility levels than it is to crush them in the first place.

(www.economist.com, 14.06.2023. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder à questão.

The great global baby bust is under way

    Across the world, birth rates are declining more rapidly than expected. That worries retired people and policymakers. In 2010, there were 98 nations and territories with fertility rates below 2.1 (known as the replacement rate) according to the United Nations. In 2021, that number had risen to 124, or more than half the countries for which data were available. The world’s 15 largest economies all have fertility rates below the replacement rate.

    As the proportion of children declines, average ages rise, particularly as old people live longer (though the rise in longevity has slowed in recent years: in Britain lifespans are flatlining and in America they are falling). Some long-running demographic trends are changing, too. Educated women have for decades tended to have fewer children. Nevertheless, fertility among the less educated is now falling.

China, population aged 21-30

    All of this poses a huge economic challenge. In parts of the world where birth rates were already low, the shortfall of young employees, who are needed to subsidise the retired, will be felt intensely. In China, the number of workers aged between 21 and 30 has already declined from 232 million in 2012, to 181 million in 2021. By the mid-2050s the United Nations forecasts there will be fewer than 100 million (see chart). China’s one-child — and later two-child — policy has contributed to the country’s decline in young workers. Recent history has shown that it is much more difficult to raise fertility levels than it is to crush them in the first place.

(www.economist.com, 14.06.2023. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder à questão.

The great global baby bust is under way

    Across the world, birth rates are declining more rapidly than expected. That worries retired people and policymakers. In 2010, there were 98 nations and territories with fertility rates below 2.1 (known as the replacement rate) according to the United Nations. In 2021, that number had risen to 124, or more than half the countries for which data were available. The world’s 15 largest economies all have fertility rates below the replacement rate.

    As the proportion of children declines, average ages rise, particularly as old people live longer (though the rise in longevity has slowed in recent years: in Britain lifespans are flatlining and in America they are falling). Some long-running demographic trends are changing, too. Educated women have for decades tended to have fewer children. Nevertheless, fertility among the less educated is now falling.

China, population aged 21-30

    All of this poses a huge economic challenge. In parts of the world where birth rates were already low, the shortfall of young employees, who are needed to subsidise the retired, will be felt intensely. In China, the number of workers aged between 21 and 30 has already declined from 232 million in 2012, to 181 million in 2021. By the mid-2050s the United Nations forecasts there will be fewer than 100 million (see chart). China’s one-child — and later two-child — policy has contributed to the country’s decline in young workers. Recent history has shown that it is much more difficult to raise fertility levels than it is to crush them in the first place.

(www.economist.com, 14.06.2023. Adaptado.)