Questões de Inglês

THE PEACEMAKERS

1 It has become standard for countries which discover large deposits of oil to declare that they will copy Norway. A president will announce the creation of a fund to park revenues from hydrocarbons. Grand plans are drawn up for spending the bounty on improving the lot of mankind. But being Norway is much harder than it sounds. Only one country seems to have the necessary mixture of wealth, generosity, internationalism, optimism and modesty required to pull it off.

2 Norway is the biggest contributor to conflict resolution, the optimistic name given to efforts to get warring parties to talk to each other. A high point here came in 1993, when Norwegian diplomats and researchers cajoled Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate face to face. The resulting Oslo accords were signed in Washington by politicians from America, Russia, Israel and Palestine. Norway was more than happy for them to take the credit for its initiative.

3 Since then Norway has sought to involve itself in many other conflicts – the less tractable the better. It has tried to repeat its Arab-Israeli success (as it seemed at the time) in Colombia, Haiti, Cyprus, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia and, most recently, Sri Lanka. This last has been criticized as naive, leading as it did to a ceasefire that allowed the combatants to rearm before the killing resumed. Yet a consistent principle runs through these efforts: that it is better to sit down with all parties, even those considered pariahs, than to exclude anyone from peace talks.

4 Norway is a generous funder of a huge number of good causes. It has, for instance, given more to alleviate hunger in the Horn of Africa this year than France or Germany. It has set up a mechanism to pay Brazil not to chop down the Amazon. And it shovels money into the United Nations. 5 This makes Norway sound like a place that models its foreign policy on the banners held up at Woodstock, but that is not the case. It is a member of NATO and is playing an outsized role in the campaign in Libya. It has repeatedly shown a willingness to put its soldiers in harm’s way. The foreign ministry estimates that 120,000 Norwegians served as peacekeepers between 1947 and 2008, and Norwegians wearing the UN’s blue berets can today be found in Sudan, Congo and Afghanistan.

The Economist - July 30th 2011

THE PEACEMAKERS

1 It has become standard for countries which discover large deposits of oil to declare that they will copy Norway. A president will announce the creation of a fund to park revenues from hydrocarbons. Grand plans are drawn up for spending the bounty on improving the lot of mankind. But being Norway is much harder than it sounds. Only one country seems to have the necessary mixture of wealth, generosity, internationalism, optimism and modesty required to pull it off.

2 Norway is the biggest contributor to conflict resolution, the optimistic name given to efforts to get warring parties to talk to each other. A high point here came in 1993, when Norwegian diplomats and researchers cajoled Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate face to face. The resulting Oslo accords were signed in Washington by politicians from America, Russia, Israel and Palestine. Norway was more than happy for them to take the credit for its initiative.

3 Since then Norway has sought to involve itself in many other conflicts – the less tractable the better. It has tried to repeat its Arab-Israeli success (as it seemed at the time) in Colombia, Haiti, Cyprus, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia and, most recently, Sri Lanka. This last has been criticized as naive, leading as it did to a ceasefire that allowed the combatants to rearm before the killing resumed. Yet a consistent principle runs through these efforts: that it is better to sit down with all parties, even those considered pariahs, than to exclude anyone from peace talks.

4 Norway is a generous funder of a huge number of good causes. It has, for instance, given more to alleviate hunger in the Horn of Africa this year than France or Germany. It has set up a mechanism to pay Brazil not to chop down the Amazon. And it shovels money into the United Nations. 5 This makes Norway sound like a place that models its foreign policy on the banners held up at Woodstock, but that is not the case. It is a member of NATO and is playing an outsized role in the campaign in Libya. It has repeatedly shown a willingness to put its soldiers in harm’s way. The foreign ministry estimates that 120,000 Norwegians served as peacekeepers between 1947 and 2008, and Norwegians wearing the UN’s blue berets can today be found in Sudan, Congo and Afghanistan.

The Economist - July 30th 2011

THE PEACEMAKERS

1 It has become standard for countries which discover large deposits of oil to declare that they will copy Norway. A president will announce the creation of a fund to park revenues from hydrocarbons. Grand plans are drawn up for spending the bounty on improving the lot of mankind. But being Norway is much harder than it sounds. Only one country seems to have the necessary mixture of wealth, generosity, internationalism, optimism and modesty required to pull it off.

2 Norway is the biggest contributor to conflict resolution, the optimistic name given to efforts to get warring parties to talk to each other. A high point here came in 1993, when Norwegian diplomats and researchers cajoled Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate face to face. The resulting Oslo accords were signed in Washington by politicians from America, Russia, Israel and Palestine. Norway was more than happy for them to take the credit for its initiative.

3 Since then Norway has sought to involve itself in many other conflicts – the less tractable the better. It has tried to repeat its Arab-Israeli success (as it seemed at the time) in Colombia, Haiti, Cyprus, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia and, most recently, Sri Lanka. This last has been criticized as naive, leading as it did to a ceasefire that allowed the combatants to rearm before the killing resumed. Yet a consistent principle runs through these efforts: that it is better to sit down with all parties, even those considered pariahs, than to exclude anyone from peace talks.

4 Norway is a generous funder of a huge number of good causes. It has, for instance, given more to alleviate hunger in the Horn of Africa this year than France or Germany. It has set up a mechanism to pay Brazil not to chop down the Amazon. And it shovels money into the United Nations. 5 This makes Norway sound like a place that models its foreign policy on the banners held up at Woodstock, but that is not the case. It is a member of NATO and is playing an outsized role in the campaign in Libya. It has repeatedly shown a willingness to put its soldiers in harm’s way. The foreign ministry estimates that 120,000 Norwegians served as peacekeepers between 1947 and 2008, and Norwegians wearing the UN’s blue berets can today be found in Sudan, Congo and Afghanistan.

The Economist - July 30th 2011

AFGHANISTAN

By Dexter Filkins

1 Afghanistan’s leaders are still known more for their criminality and incompetence than for their ability to govern. After spending years pushing President Hamid Karzai to crack down on corruption in his government, the Americans and their NATO partners have largely given up. Last year, Afghan prosecutors were prepared to indict as many as two dozen officials on corruption charges. But the arrest of a single Presidential aide last July was a fiasco – after Karzai publicly objected, the aide was released and the charges against him dropped. Since then, not one senior Afghan official has been brought to justice. Many of the best public-corruption prosecutors have been harassed or reassigned. Support for the Taliban insurgents is often a reaction against the venality of Afghanistan’s leaders.

2 And then there is President Karzai himself, who appears to be increasingly estranged not only from his NATO allies but also from reality. For years, American officials put up with Karzai’s excesses and even apologized for them; in so doing, they encouraged him to become more and more delusional. In a speech earlier this month, Karzai suggested to an audience of his countrymen that NATO forces were using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan, and accused them of killing innocent civilians and damaging the environment. He said of the Americans, “They have come to our country for their owngoals and interests, and they are using our country.”

3 It will not be difficult to say goodbye to a man like this. But what of the thirty million other Afghans? The premise that anchored counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan – and in Iraq – was never explicitly humanitarian. The idea was that America could succeed only by helping these countries find a way to stand on their own. Otherwise, the places would collapse, and we’d have to go back. In Iraq, after many years of bloodshed, the Americans seem to have found a formula for maintaining rudimentary stability. In Afghanistan, after years of mismanagement and neglect, we manifestly have not. The country remains riddled with violence, and negotiations with the Taliban – a last-resort option – have led nowhere. It is not hard to imagine a repeat of the Afghan civil war, which engulfed the country after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, and which ultimately gave rise to the Taliban. Bloodied but unbroken, the Taliban hardly seem like an army preparing to beg for peace. Their leaders greeted Obama’s words with a swift promise: ”Our armed struggle will increase.”

adapted from THE NEW YORKER JULY 4, 2011

AFGHANISTAN

By Dexter Filkins

1 Afghanistan’s leaders are still known more for their criminality and incompetence than for their ability to govern. After spending years pushing President Hamid Karzai to crack down on corruption in his government, the Americans and their NATO partners have largely given up. Last year, Afghan prosecutors were prepared to indict as many as two dozen officials on corruption charges. But the arrest of a single Presidential aide last July was a fiasco – after Karzai publicly objected, the aide was released and the charges against him dropped. Since then, not one senior Afghan official has been brought to justice. Many of the best public-corruption prosecutors have been harassed or reassigned. Support for the Taliban insurgents is often a reaction against the venality of Afghanistan’s leaders.

2 And then there is President Karzai himself, who appears to be increasingly estranged not only from his NATO allies but also from reality. For years, American officials put up with Karzai’s excesses and even apologized for them; in so doing, they encouraged him to become more and more delusional. In a speech earlier this month, Karzai suggested to an audience of his countrymen that NATO forces were using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan, and accused them of killing innocent civilians and damaging the environment. He said of the Americans, “They have come to our country for their owngoals and interests, and they are using our country.”

3 It will not be difficult to say goodbye to a man like this. But what of the thirty million other Afghans? The premise that anchored counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan – and in Iraq – was never explicitly humanitarian. The idea was that America could succeed only by helping these countries find a way to stand on their own. Otherwise, the places would collapse, and we’d have to go back. In Iraq, after many years of bloodshed, the Americans seem to have found a formula for maintaining rudimentary stability. In Afghanistan, after years of mismanagement and neglect, we manifestly have not. The country remains riddled with violence, and negotiations with the Taliban – a last-resort option – have led nowhere. It is not hard to imagine a repeat of the Afghan civil war, which engulfed the country after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, and which ultimately gave rise to the Taliban. Bloodied but unbroken, the Taliban hardly seem like an army preparing to beg for peace. Their leaders greeted Obama’s words with a swift promise: ”Our armed struggle will increase.”

adapted from THE NEW YORKER JULY 4, 2011

AFGHANISTAN

By Dexter Filkins

1 Afghanistan’s leaders are still known more for their criminality and incompetence than for their ability to govern. After spending years pushing President Hamid Karzai to crack down on corruption in his government, the Americans and their NATO partners have largely given up. Last year, Afghan prosecutors were prepared to indict as many as two dozen officials on corruption charges. But the arrest of a single Presidential aide last July was a fiasco – after Karzai publicly objected, the aide was released and the charges against him dropped. Since then, not one senior Afghan official has been brought to justice. Many of the best public-corruption prosecutors have been harassed or reassigned. Support for the Taliban insurgents is often a reaction against the venality of Afghanistan’s leaders.

2 And then there is President Karzai himself, who appears to be increasingly estranged not only from his NATO allies but also from reality. For years, American officials put up with Karzai’s excesses and even apologized for them; in so doing, they encouraged him to become more and more delusional. In a speech earlier this month, Karzai suggested to an audience of his countrymen that NATO forces were using nuclear weapons in Afghanistan, and accused them of killing innocent civilians and damaging the environment. He said of the Americans, “They have come to our country for their owngoals and interests, and they are using our country.”

3 It will not be difficult to say goodbye to a man like this. But what of the thirty million other Afghans? The premise that anchored counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan – and in Iraq – was never explicitly humanitarian. The idea was that America could succeed only by helping these countries find a way to stand on their own. Otherwise, the places would collapse, and we’d have to go back. In Iraq, after many years of bloodshed, the Americans seem to have found a formula for maintaining rudimentary stability. In Afghanistan, after years of mismanagement and neglect, we manifestly have not. The country remains riddled with violence, and negotiations with the Taliban – a last-resort option – have led nowhere. It is not hard to imagine a repeat of the Afghan civil war, which engulfed the country after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, and which ultimately gave rise to the Taliban. Bloodied but unbroken, the Taliban hardly seem like an army preparing to beg for peace. Their leaders greeted Obama’s words with a swift promise: ”Our armed struggle will increase.”

adapted from THE NEW YORKER JULY 4, 2011