Questões de Inglês

CULTURE WAR

By James Cuno

[1]   In December 2007, the Italian government opened an exhibition in Rome of 69 artifacts that four major U.S. museums had agreed to return to Italy on
the grounds [base legal] that they had been illegally excavated and exported from the country. Leading nearly 200 journalists through the exhibition,
Francesco Rutelli, Italy’s then cultural minister, proclaimed, “The odyssey of these objects, which started with their brutal removal from the bowels
[entranhas] of the earth, didn’t end on the shelf of some American museum. With nostalgia, they have returned. These beautiful pieces have reconquered
their souls.” Rutelli was not just anthropomorphizing ancient artifacts by giving them souls. By insisting that they were the property of Italy and important
to its national identity, he was also giving them citizenship.
[2]   Rutelli has hardly been the only government official to insist that artifacts belong to the places from which they originally came. In 2011, the German
government agreed to return to Turkey a 3,000-year-old sphinx that German archaeologists had excavated from central Anatolia in the early twentieth
century. Afterward, the Turkish minister of culture, Ertugrul Gunay, declared that “each and every antiquity in any part of the world should eventually go
back to its homeland.”
[3]   Such claims on the national identity of antiquities are at the root of many states’ cultural property laws, which in the last few decades have been used
by governments to reclaim objects from museums and other collections abroad. Despite UNESCO’s declaration that “no culture is a hermetically sealed
entity,” governments are increasingly making claims of ownership of cultural property on the basis of self-proclaimed and fixed state-based identities.
Many use ancient cultural objects to affirm continuity with a glorious and powerful past as a way of burnishing [lustrar, polir] their modern political image
– Egypt with the Pharaonic era, Iran with ancient Persia, Italy with the Roman Empire. These arguments amount to protectionist claims on culture. Rather
than acknowledge that culture is in a state of constant flux, modern governments present it as standing still, in order to use cultural objects to promote
their own states’ national identities.
[4]   In the battle over cultural heritage, repatriation claims based strictly on national origin are more than just denials of cultural exchange: they are also
arguments against the promise of encyclopedic museums – a category that includes the Metropolitan Museum of Art, in New York; the British Museum, in
London; and the Louvre, in Paris. By presenting the artifacts of one time and one culture next to those of other times and cultures, encyclopedic museums
encourage curiosity about the world and its many peoples. They also promote a cosmopolitan worldview, as opposed to a nationalist concept of cultural
identity. In an era of globalization that is nonetheless marked by resurgent nationalism and sectarianism, antiquities and their history should not be used
to stoke [fortalecer] such narrow identities. Instead, they should express the guiding principles of the world’s great museums: pluralism, diversity, and the
idea that culture shouldn’t stop at borders – and nor, for that matter, should the cosmopolitan ideals represented by encyclopedic museums. Rather than
acquiesce to frivolous, if stubborn, calls for repatriation, often accompanied by threats of cultural embargoes, encyclopedic museums should encourage
the development of mutually beneficial relationships with museums everywhere in the world that share their cosmopolitan vision. Cultural property should
be recognized for what it is: the legacy of humankind and not of the modern nation-state, subject to the political agenda of its current ruling elite.

Adapted from Foreign Affairs November/December 2014.

(NOTE: The Panama papers is the name given to millions of leaked documents belonging to the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which sets up offshore companies, trusts, and foundations, some of which have allegedly been used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other illegal purposes.)

THE PANAMA PAPERS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

[1]  The Kremlin had warned that an attack was coming. “Comrades are working in accordance with tried and tested schemes,” Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
said last month, predicting an attempt to “rock the boat” ahead of elections in Russia. But when the Panama papers appeared, revealing a $2 billion trail leading to Mr
Putin’s inner circle, the leadership exhaled. “We were expecting more impressive results,” said Mr Peskov. “They have found little new.”
[2]  Suggestions of shady dealings in the president’s court neither surprise nor enrage most Russians. Only a few opposition activists came out to protest in central Moscow
on April 5th; several were quickly detained. Some 76% of the country believes its authorities are corrupt; 66% say Mr Putin bears significant or full responsibility for such
high-level corruption. Yet he remains secure. “Corruption is seen as a fact of life, and the sense that there’s nothing we can do about it is pervasive,” says Maria Lipman,
editor of the journal Counterpoint. The latest revelations will do nothing to change those perceptions.
[3]  With the help of friendly media, the Kremlin has instead used the leak to reinforce a familiar story of Western interference. As Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre,
an independent pollster, points out, Russian reactions depend almost entirely on the nature of the news coverage.
[4]  State-run television networks said little about the Panama papers except to present them as part of an “information war” against Mr Putin, “the curatorial work of the
US State Department itself”. Mr Putin’s name, they note, does not appear in the Mossack Fonseca documents. Questions about how the president’s old friend, the cellist
Sergei Roldugin, came into such enormous wealth are dismissed as “Putinophobia”. Andrey Kostin, head of the state-run bank VTB, which allegedly made loans to Mr
Roldugin through a Cypriot subsidiary, called the notion of Mr Putin’s involvement “bullshit”.
[5]  The documents may prove far more damaging for Mr Putin’s counterpart in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. A confectionery magnate known as the “Chocolate King”, Mr
Poroshenko promised to sell his company, Roshen, after winning the presidency in May 2014. Earlier this year he announced that he had transferred his assets to a blind
trust. Instead, the documents indicate, they were moved offshore to the British Virgin Islands (BVI).
[6]  Legally, Mr Poroshenko may have an explanation. His associates suggest, and some experts agree, that the BVI company created in his name was nothing more than
a vehicle for a pre-sale restructuring of Roshen. The documents do not suggest Mr Poroshenko abused his office to enrich himself. The Ukrainian general prosecutor’s office
says that so far it “does not see any elements of a crime”.
[7]  Politically, though, this is a giant problem for a president who rode a revolution to power promising to clean up his country’s crooked political system.
Adapted from The Economist April 9, 2016.

(NOTE: The Panama papers is the name given to millions of leaked documents belonging to the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which sets up offshore companies, trusts, and foundations, some of which have allegedly been used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other illegal purposes.)

THE PANAMA PAPERS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

[1]  The Kremlin had warned that an attack was coming. “Comrades are working in accordance with tried and tested schemes,” Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
said last month, predicting an attempt to “rock the boat” ahead of elections in Russia. But when the Panama papers appeared, revealing a $2 billion trail leading to Mr
Putin’s inner circle, the leadership exhaled. “We were expecting more impressive results,” said Mr Peskov. “They have found little new.”
[2]  Suggestions of shady dealings in the president’s court neither surprise nor enrage most Russians. Only a few opposition activists came out to protest in central Moscow
on April 5th; several were quickly detained. Some 76% of the country believes its authorities are corrupt; 66% say Mr Putin bears significant or full responsibility for such
high-level corruption. Yet he remains secure. “Corruption is seen as a fact of life, and the sense that there’s nothing we can do about it is pervasive,” says Maria Lipman,
editor of the journal Counterpoint. The latest revelations will do nothing to change those perceptions.
[3]  With the help of friendly media, the Kremlin has instead used the leak to reinforce a familiar story of Western interference. As Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre,
an independent pollster, points out, Russian reactions depend almost entirely on the nature of the news coverage.
[4]  State-run television networks said little about the Panama papers except to present them as part of an “information war” against Mr Putin, “the curatorial work of the
US State Department itself”. Mr Putin’s name, they note, does not appear in the Mossack Fonseca documents. Questions about how the president’s old friend, the cellist
Sergei Roldugin, came into such enormous wealth are dismissed as “Putinophobia”. Andrey Kostin, head of the state-run bank VTB, which allegedly made loans to Mr
Roldugin through a Cypriot subsidiary, called the notion of Mr Putin’s involvement “bullshit”.
[5]  The documents may prove far more damaging for Mr Putin’s counterpart in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. A confectionery magnate known as the “Chocolate King”, Mr
Poroshenko promised to sell his company, Roshen, after winning the presidency in May 2014. Earlier this year he announced that he had transferred his assets to a blind
trust. Instead, the documents indicate, they were moved offshore to the British Virgin Islands (BVI).
[6]  Legally, Mr Poroshenko may have an explanation. His associates suggest, and some experts agree, that the BVI company created in his name was nothing more than
a vehicle for a pre-sale restructuring of Roshen. The documents do not suggest Mr Poroshenko abused his office to enrich himself. The Ukrainian general prosecutor’s office
says that so far it “does not see any elements of a crime”.
[7]  Politically, though, this is a giant problem for a president who rode a revolution to power promising to clean up his country’s crooked political system.
Adapted from The Economist April 9, 2016.

(NOTE: The Panama papers is the name given to millions of leaked documents belonging to the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which sets up offshore companies, trusts, and foundations, some of which have allegedly been used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other illegal purposes.)

THE PANAMA PAPERS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

[1]  The Kremlin had warned that an attack was coming. “Comrades are working in accordance with tried and tested schemes,” Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
said last month, predicting an attempt to “rock the boat” ahead of elections in Russia. But when the Panama papers appeared, revealing a $2 billion trail leading to Mr
Putin’s inner circle, the leadership exhaled. “We were expecting more impressive results,” said Mr Peskov. “They have found little new.”
[2]  Suggestions of shady dealings in the president’s court neither surprise nor enrage most Russians. Only a few opposition activists came out to protest in central Moscow
on April 5th; several were quickly detained. Some 76% of the country believes its authorities are corrupt; 66% say Mr Putin bears significant or full responsibility for such
high-level corruption. Yet he remains secure. “Corruption is seen as a fact of life, and the sense that there’s nothing we can do about it is pervasive,” says Maria Lipman,
editor of the journal Counterpoint. The latest revelations will do nothing to change those perceptions.
[3]  With the help of friendly media, the Kremlin has instead used the leak to reinforce a familiar story of Western interference. As Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre,
an independent pollster, points out, Russian reactions depend almost entirely on the nature of the news coverage.
[4]  State-run television networks said little about the Panama papers except to present them as part of an “information war” against Mr Putin, “the curatorial work of the
US State Department itself”. Mr Putin’s name, they note, does not appear in the Mossack Fonseca documents. Questions about how the president’s old friend, the cellist
Sergei Roldugin, came into such enormous wealth are dismissed as “Putinophobia”. Andrey Kostin, head of the state-run bank VTB, which allegedly made loans to Mr
Roldugin through a Cypriot subsidiary, called the notion of Mr Putin’s involvement “bullshit”.
[5]  The documents may prove far more damaging for Mr Putin’s counterpart in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. A confectionery magnate known as the “Chocolate King”, Mr
Poroshenko promised to sell his company, Roshen, after winning the presidency in May 2014. Earlier this year he announced that he had transferred his assets to a blind
trust. Instead, the documents indicate, they were moved offshore to the British Virgin Islands (BVI).
[6]  Legally, Mr Poroshenko may have an explanation. His associates suggest, and some experts agree, that the BVI company created in his name was nothing more than
a vehicle for a pre-sale restructuring of Roshen. The documents do not suggest Mr Poroshenko abused his office to enrich himself. The Ukrainian general prosecutor’s office
says that so far it “does not see any elements of a crime”.
[7]  Politically, though, this is a giant problem for a president who rode a revolution to power promising to clean up his country’s crooked political system.
Adapted from The Economist April 9, 2016.

(NOTE: The Panama papers is the name given to millions of leaked documents belonging to the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which sets up offshore companies, trusts, and foundations, some of which have allegedly been used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other illegal purposes.)

THE PANAMA PAPERS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

[1]  The Kremlin had warned that an attack was coming. “Comrades are working in accordance with tried and tested schemes,” Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
said last month, predicting an attempt to “rock the boat” ahead of elections in Russia. But when the Panama papers appeared, revealing a $2 billion trail leading to Mr
Putin’s inner circle, the leadership exhaled. “We were expecting more impressive results,” said Mr Peskov. “They have found little new.”
[2]  Suggestions of shady dealings in the president’s court neither surprise nor enrage most Russians. Only a few opposition activists came out to protest in central Moscow
on April 5th; several were quickly detained. Some 76% of the country believes its authorities are corrupt; 66% say Mr Putin bears significant or full responsibility for such
high-level corruption. Yet he remains secure. “Corruption is seen as a fact of life, and the sense that there’s nothing we can do about it is pervasive,” says Maria Lipman,
editor of the journal Counterpoint. The latest revelations will do nothing to change those perceptions.
[3]  With the help of friendly media, the Kremlin has instead used the leak to reinforce a familiar story of Western interference. As Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre,
an independent pollster, points out, Russian reactions depend almost entirely on the nature of the news coverage.
[4]  State-run television networks said little about the Panama papers except to present them as part of an “information war” against Mr Putin, “the curatorial work of the
US State Department itself”. Mr Putin’s name, they note, does not appear in the Mossack Fonseca documents. Questions about how the president’s old friend, the cellist
Sergei Roldugin, came into such enormous wealth are dismissed as “Putinophobia”. Andrey Kostin, head of the state-run bank VTB, which allegedly made loans to Mr
Roldugin through a Cypriot subsidiary, called the notion of Mr Putin’s involvement “bullshit”.
[5]  The documents may prove far more damaging for Mr Putin’s counterpart in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. A confectionery magnate known as the “Chocolate King”, Mr
Poroshenko promised to sell his company, Roshen, after winning the presidency in May 2014. Earlier this year he announced that he had transferred his assets to a blind
trust. Instead, the documents indicate, they were moved offshore to the British Virgin Islands (BVI).
[6]  Legally, Mr Poroshenko may have an explanation. His associates suggest, and some experts agree, that the BVI company created in his name was nothing more than
a vehicle for a pre-sale restructuring of Roshen. The documents do not suggest Mr Poroshenko abused his office to enrich himself. The Ukrainian general prosecutor’s office
says that so far it “does not see any elements of a crime”.
[7]  Politically, though, this is a giant problem for a president who rode a revolution to power promising to clean up his country’s crooked political system.
Adapted from The Economist April 9, 2016.

(NOTE: The Panama papers is the name given to millions of leaked documents belonging to the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which sets up offshore companies, trusts, and foundations, some of which have allegedly been used for tax evasion, money laundering, and other illegal purposes.)

THE PANAMA PAPERS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

[1]  The Kremlin had warned that an attack was coming. “Comrades are working in accordance with tried and tested schemes,” Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov,
said last month, predicting an attempt to “rock the boat” ahead of elections in Russia. But when the Panama papers appeared, revealing a $2 billion trail leading to Mr
Putin’s inner circle, the leadership exhaled. “We were expecting more impressive results,” said Mr Peskov. “They have found little new.”
[2]  Suggestions of shady dealings in the president’s court neither surprise nor enrage most Russians. Only a few opposition activists came out to protest in central Moscow
on April 5th; several were quickly detained. Some 76% of the country believes its authorities are corrupt; 66% say Mr Putin bears significant or full responsibility for such
high-level corruption. Yet he remains secure. “Corruption is seen as a fact of life, and the sense that there’s nothing we can do about it is pervasive,” says Maria Lipman,
editor of the journal Counterpoint. The latest revelations will do nothing to change those perceptions.
[3]  With the help of friendly media, the Kremlin has instead used the leak to reinforce a familiar story of Western interference. As Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Centre,
an independent pollster, points out, Russian reactions depend almost entirely on the nature of the news coverage.
[4]  State-run television networks said little about the Panama papers except to present them as part of an “information war” against Mr Putin, “the curatorial work of the
US State Department itself”. Mr Putin’s name, they note, does not appear in the Mossack Fonseca documents. Questions about how the president’s old friend, the cellist
Sergei Roldugin, came into such enormous wealth are dismissed as “Putinophobia”. Andrey Kostin, head of the state-run bank VTB, which allegedly made loans to Mr
Roldugin through a Cypriot subsidiary, called the notion of Mr Putin’s involvement “bullshit”.
[5]  The documents may prove far more damaging for Mr Putin’s counterpart in Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. A confectionery magnate known as the “Chocolate King”, Mr
Poroshenko promised to sell his company, Roshen, after winning the presidency in May 2014. Earlier this year he announced that he had transferred his assets to a blind
trust. Instead, the documents indicate, they were moved offshore to the British Virgin Islands (BVI).
[6]  Legally, Mr Poroshenko may have an explanation. His associates suggest, and some experts agree, that the BVI company created in his name was nothing more than
a vehicle for a pre-sale restructuring of Roshen. The documents do not suggest Mr Poroshenko abused his office to enrich himself. The Ukrainian general prosecutor’s office
says that so far it “does not see any elements of a crime”.
[7]  Politically, though, this is a giant problem for a president who rode a revolution to power promising to clean up his country’s crooked political system.
Adapted from The Economist April 9, 2016.