Questões de Inglês

ANYTHING CAN BE RESCINDED

By Isabel Hull

[1]     The Paris Peace Pact of 1928 is a treaty few remember and which is ridiculed by many of those who do. Otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact –
after its authors, the US secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand – its signatories agreed specifically to ‘condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’.
Lacking any means of enforcement, and seemingly swept aside by the Second World War only 11 years later, Kellogg-Briand has been seen as hopelessly
utopian, as evanescent and dated as the Charleston (a popular dance of that period). But Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book The
Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw War, argue that it was revolutionary. By outlawing war, it laid the legal foundations for a ‘New World Order’
which still prevails, but which we fail to appreciate.
[2]     The book begins with a bleak description of the ‘Old World Order’, which rested on the right of states, in the absence of a world court, to resort to war
to redress grievances or solve disputes. War was a legal mechanism. Hathaway and Shapiro’s study of more than four hundred declarations of war from
the late 16th century to 1939 reveals that self-defence and the enforcement of treaty, international or succession laws were the reasons cited most often
by states. In addition to permitting frequent armed conflict, the lawful status of war had other consequences for international relations. Since force could
be used to resolve conflicts, the system rewarded the powerful, sanctifying the principle of ‘might is right’. It also legitimated conquest, both as
compensation for injury and as the outcome of a contest of force in which the weaker side lost. It permitted the threat of force (gunboat diplomacy). It
protected the decision makers who waged war and the soldiers who fought it, because both were engaged in a legal activity. Killing in war wasn’t murder.
And, finally, lawful war required absolute impartiality from neutrals (for example, in their trade or commerce with belligerents), since they were not parties
to the dispute. Economic sanctions were therefore illegal. This state of affairs lasted into the 20th century, and Hathaway and Shapiro see the First World
War as its ‘terrible culmination’. Even the League of Nations ‘did not herald’ [anunciar] its end because its covenant still permitted member states to resort
to war over serious, non-judiciable disputes after a three-month cooling-off period.
[3]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s premise is that since states seemed incapable of weaning themselves off [se desacostumar de] warfare, civil society had to
intervene.
[4]     Among the ‘internationalists’ who helped broker, institutionalize and interpret the Kellogg-Briand Pact, one of the most significant was Hersch
Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University. In the late 1930s, he rigorously and successfully argued that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact had overturned the basic structures of the international order. Neutrals were no longer bound [amarrados, obrigados] to impartiality,
permitting policies that helped victims of aggression. And because it resulted from a criminal act, conquest was now illegal. Individual leaders could be
held responsible for waging [fazer, proseguir] illegal wars (the principle behind the Nuremberg Trials). And treaties extorted by coercion were invalid.
Lauterpacht’s briefs [pareceres] to the US and British governments in the 1940s helped establish these principles, making him ‘the father of the New World
Order’, which since 1945 has been characterized by remarkably few inter-state wars or annexations.
[5]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s point, then, is that ‘for all its problems, the New World Order is better than the Old.’

Adapted from the London Review of Books, 26 April 2018. 

ANYTHING CAN BE RESCINDED

By Isabel Hull

[1]     The Paris Peace Pact of 1928 is a treaty few remember and which is ridiculed by many of those who do. Otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact –
after its authors, the US secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand – its signatories agreed specifically to ‘condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’.
Lacking any means of enforcement, and seemingly swept aside by the Second World War only 11 years later, Kellogg-Briand has been seen as hopelessly
utopian, as evanescent and dated as the Charleston (a popular dance of that period). But Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book The
Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw War, argue that it was revolutionary. By outlawing war, it laid the legal foundations for a ‘New World Order’
which still prevails, but which we fail to appreciate.
[2]     The book begins with a bleak description of the ‘Old World Order’, which rested on the right of states, in the absence of a world court, to resort to war
to redress grievances or solve disputes. War was a legal mechanism. Hathaway and Shapiro’s study of more than four hundred declarations of war from
the late 16th century to 1939 reveals that self-defence and the enforcement of treaty, international or succession laws were the reasons cited most often
by states. In addition to permitting frequent armed conflict, the lawful status of war had other consequences for international relations. Since force could
be used to resolve conflicts, the system rewarded the powerful, sanctifying the principle of ‘might is right’. It also legitimated conquest, both as
compensation for injury and as the outcome of a contest of force in which the weaker side lost. It permitted the threat of force (gunboat diplomacy). It
protected the decision makers who waged war and the soldiers who fought it, because both were engaged in a legal activity. Killing in war wasn’t murder.
And, finally, lawful war required absolute impartiality from neutrals (for example, in their trade or commerce with belligerents), since they were not parties
to the dispute. Economic sanctions were therefore illegal. This state of affairs lasted into the 20th century, and Hathaway and Shapiro see the First World
War as its ‘terrible culmination’. Even the League of Nations ‘did not herald’ [anunciar] its end because its covenant still permitted member states to resort
to war over serious, non-judiciable disputes after a three-month cooling-off period.
[3]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s premise is that since states seemed incapable of weaning themselves off [se desacostumar de] warfare, civil society had to
intervene.
[4]     Among the ‘internationalists’ who helped broker, institutionalize and interpret the Kellogg-Briand Pact, one of the most significant was Hersch
Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University. In the late 1930s, he rigorously and successfully argued that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact had overturned the basic structures of the international order. Neutrals were no longer bound [amarrados, obrigados] to impartiality,
permitting policies that helped victims of aggression. And because it resulted from a criminal act, conquest was now illegal. Individual leaders could be
held responsible for waging [fazer, proseguir] illegal wars (the principle behind the Nuremberg Trials). And treaties extorted by coercion were invalid.
Lauterpacht’s briefs [pareceres] to the US and British governments in the 1940s helped establish these principles, making him ‘the father of the New World
Order’, which since 1945 has been characterized by remarkably few inter-state wars or annexations.
[5]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s point, then, is that ‘for all its problems, the New World Order is better than the Old.’

Adapted from the London Review of Books, 26 April 2018. 

ANYTHING CAN BE RESCINDED

By Isabel Hull

[1]     The Paris Peace Pact of 1928 is a treaty few remember and which is ridiculed by many of those who do. Otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact –
after its authors, the US secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand – its signatories agreed specifically to ‘condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’.
Lacking any means of enforcement, and seemingly swept aside by the Second World War only 11 years later, Kellogg-Briand has been seen as hopelessly
utopian, as evanescent and dated as the Charleston (a popular dance of that period). But Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book The
Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw War, argue that it was revolutionary. By outlawing war, it laid the legal foundations for a ‘New World Order’
which still prevails, but which we fail to appreciate.
[2]     The book begins with a bleak description of the ‘Old World Order’, which rested on the right of states, in the absence of a world court, to resort to war
to redress grievances or solve disputes. War was a legal mechanism. Hathaway and Shapiro’s study of more than four hundred declarations of war from
the late 16th century to 1939 reveals that self-defence and the enforcement of treaty, international or succession laws were the reasons cited most often
by states. In addition to permitting frequent armed conflict, the lawful status of war had other consequences for international relations. Since force could
be used to resolve conflicts, the system rewarded the powerful, sanctifying the principle of ‘might is right’. It also legitimated conquest, both as
compensation for injury and as the outcome of a contest of force in which the weaker side lost. It permitted the threat of force (gunboat diplomacy). It
protected the decision makers who waged war and the soldiers who fought it, because both were engaged in a legal activity. Killing in war wasn’t murder.
And, finally, lawful war required absolute impartiality from neutrals (for example, in their trade or commerce with belligerents), since they were not parties
to the dispute. Economic sanctions were therefore illegal. This state of affairs lasted into the 20th century, and Hathaway and Shapiro see the First World
War as its ‘terrible culmination’. Even the League of Nations ‘did not herald’ [anunciar] its end because its covenant still permitted member states to resort
to war over serious, non-judiciable disputes after a three-month cooling-off period.
[3]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s premise is that since states seemed incapable of weaning themselves off [se desacostumar de] warfare, civil society had to
intervene.
[4]     Among the ‘internationalists’ who helped broker, institutionalize and interpret the Kellogg-Briand Pact, one of the most significant was Hersch
Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University. In the late 1930s, he rigorously and successfully argued that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact had overturned the basic structures of the international order. Neutrals were no longer bound [amarrados, obrigados] to impartiality,
permitting policies that helped victims of aggression. And because it resulted from a criminal act, conquest was now illegal. Individual leaders could be
held responsible for waging [fazer, proseguir] illegal wars (the principle behind the Nuremberg Trials). And treaties extorted by coercion were invalid.
Lauterpacht’s briefs [pareceres] to the US and British governments in the 1940s helped establish these principles, making him ‘the father of the New World
Order’, which since 1945 has been characterized by remarkably few inter-state wars or annexations.
[5]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s point, then, is that ‘for all its problems, the New World Order is better than the Old.’

Adapted from the London Review of Books, 26 April 2018. 

ANYTHING CAN BE RESCINDED

By Isabel Hull

[1]     The Paris Peace Pact of 1928 is a treaty few remember and which is ridiculed by many of those who do. Otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact –
after its authors, the US secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand – its signatories agreed specifically to ‘condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’.
Lacking any means of enforcement, and seemingly swept aside by the Second World War only 11 years later, Kellogg-Briand has been seen as hopelessly
utopian, as evanescent and dated as the Charleston (a popular dance of that period). But Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book The
Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw War, argue that it was revolutionary. By outlawing war, it laid the legal foundations for a ‘New World Order’
which still prevails, but which we fail to appreciate.
[2]     The book begins with a bleak description of the ‘Old World Order’, which rested on the right of states, in the absence of a world court, to resort to war
to redress grievances or solve disputes. War was a legal mechanism. Hathaway and Shapiro’s study of more than four hundred declarations of war from
the late 16th century to 1939 reveals that self-defence and the enforcement of treaty, international or succession laws were the reasons cited most often
by states. In addition to permitting frequent armed conflict, the lawful status of war had other consequences for international relations. Since force could
be used to resolve conflicts, the system rewarded the powerful, sanctifying the principle of ‘might is right’. It also legitimated conquest, both as
compensation for injury and as the outcome of a contest of force in which the weaker side lost. It permitted the threat of force (gunboat diplomacy). It
protected the decision makers who waged war and the soldiers who fought it, because both were engaged in a legal activity. Killing in war wasn’t murder.
And, finally, lawful war required absolute impartiality from neutrals (for example, in their trade or commerce with belligerents), since they were not parties
to the dispute. Economic sanctions were therefore illegal. This state of affairs lasted into the 20th century, and Hathaway and Shapiro see the First World
War as its ‘terrible culmination’. Even the League of Nations ‘did not herald’ [anunciar] its end because its covenant still permitted member states to resort
to war over serious, non-judiciable disputes after a three-month cooling-off period.
[3]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s premise is that since states seemed incapable of weaning themselves off [se desacostumar de] warfare, civil society had to
intervene.
[4]     Among the ‘internationalists’ who helped broker, institutionalize and interpret the Kellogg-Briand Pact, one of the most significant was Hersch
Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University. In the late 1930s, he rigorously and successfully argued that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact had overturned the basic structures of the international order. Neutrals were no longer bound [amarrados, obrigados] to impartiality,
permitting policies that helped victims of aggression. And because it resulted from a criminal act, conquest was now illegal. Individual leaders could be
held responsible for waging [fazer, proseguir] illegal wars (the principle behind the Nuremberg Trials). And treaties extorted by coercion were invalid.
Lauterpacht’s briefs [pareceres] to the US and British governments in the 1940s helped establish these principles, making him ‘the father of the New World
Order’, which since 1945 has been characterized by remarkably few inter-state wars or annexations.
[5]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s point, then, is that ‘for all its problems, the New World Order is better than the Old.’

Adapted from the London Review of Books, 26 April 2018. 

ANYTHING CAN BE RESCINDED

By Isabel Hull

[1]     The Paris Peace Pact of 1928 is a treaty few remember and which is ridiculed by many of those who do. Otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact –
after its authors, the US secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand – its signatories agreed specifically to ‘condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’.
Lacking any means of enforcement, and seemingly swept aside by the Second World War only 11 years later, Kellogg-Briand has been seen as hopelessly
utopian, as evanescent and dated as the Charleston (a popular dance of that period). But Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book The
Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw War, argue that it was revolutionary. By outlawing war, it laid the legal foundations for a ‘New World Order’
which still prevails, but which we fail to appreciate.
[2]     The book begins with a bleak description of the ‘Old World Order’, which rested on the right of states, in the absence of a world court, to resort to war
to redress grievances or solve disputes. War was a legal mechanism. Hathaway and Shapiro’s study of more than four hundred declarations of war from
the late 16th century to 1939 reveals that self-defence and the enforcement of treaty, international or succession laws were the reasons cited most often
by states. In addition to permitting frequent armed conflict, the lawful status of war had other consequences for international relations. Since force could
be used to resolve conflicts, the system rewarded the powerful, sanctifying the principle of ‘might is right’. It also legitimated conquest, both as
compensation for injury and as the outcome of a contest of force in which the weaker side lost. It permitted the threat of force (gunboat diplomacy). It
protected the decision makers who waged war and the soldiers who fought it, because both were engaged in a legal activity. Killing in war wasn’t murder.
And, finally, lawful war required absolute impartiality from neutrals (for example, in their trade or commerce with belligerents), since they were not parties
to the dispute. Economic sanctions were therefore illegal. This state of affairs lasted into the 20th century, and Hathaway and Shapiro see the First World
War as its ‘terrible culmination’. Even the League of Nations ‘did not herald’ [anunciar] its end because its covenant still permitted member states to resort
to war over serious, non-judiciable disputes after a three-month cooling-off period.
[3]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s premise is that since states seemed incapable of weaning themselves off [se desacostumar de] warfare, civil society had to
intervene.
[4]     Among the ‘internationalists’ who helped broker, institutionalize and interpret the Kellogg-Briand Pact, one of the most significant was Hersch
Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University. In the late 1930s, he rigorously and successfully argued that the Kellogg-

Briand Pact had overturned the basic structures of the international order. Neutrals were no longer bound [amarrados, obrigados] to impartiality,
permitting policies that helped victims of aggression. And because it resulted from a criminal act, conquest was now illegal. Individual leaders could be
held responsible for waging [fazer, proseguir] illegal wars (the principle behind the Nuremberg Trials). And treaties extorted by coercion were invalid.
Lauterpacht’s briefs [pareceres] to the US and British governments in the 1940s helped establish these principles, making him ‘the father of the New World
Order’, which since 1945 has been characterized by remarkably few inter-state wars or annexations.
[5]     Hathaway and Shapiro’s point, then, is that ‘for all its problems, the New World Order is better than the Old.’

Adapted from the London Review of Books, 26 April 2018. 

PERFECT LIE
By Anna Blundy

[1]   It was as though he was sitting in the consulting room with us, a golden figure of male beauty, intelligent sensitivity, sparkling wit and an endless
capacity for good. This was established by my patient as a stark contrast to all her multitudinous failings. “I don’t deserve him,” she said, twisting a tissue
in her bitten fingers, legs tucked meekly under her chair. She began (again) to detail her repulsiveness and stupidity.
[2]   She met this Adonis at university where he excelled at everything. Strangely enough, he liked her and they began a relationship that made her feel
inadequate. “He’s just so good socially. Really funny and chatty,” she explained. “I know people look at us and wonder why he’s with me,” she added.
[3]   I was supposed to nod and understand that it must be very painful to be so ugly and crap while he is so perfect. Did I mention that he is multilingual
and that his strong eco-credentials will, sooner rather than later, save the world? Sitting there looking at this crushed girl, I really started to hate this guy.
“He says he can’t put up with my depression much longer. He says it’s embarrassing.” Our Adonis was constantly going to Norway for long stretches. “There
was a girl who liked him, but nothing happened,” she said, eyes pleading.
[4]   Two years into our once-a-week sessions, my patient looks very different. She meets my gaze, smiles, is dressed less like a five-year-old and more like
a 30-year-old, and is struggling with her now husband. “He’s such a show off. He dominates conversations so nobody else can say anything,” she tells me,
describing an excruciating evening at an Indian restaurant. She is exasperated by his bullying at home, always shouting about her incompetent recycling,
her use of the central heating and her not switching lights off (when she is actually in the room). While her job in publishing is going well, he is currently
out of work, the eco-start up thing that he was involved with didn’t start up.
[5]   I won’t go into detail about her psychotherapy journey, but she is a favourite in my supervision group because she is funny and insightful, desperate
to get out of depression, initially to please her Adonis, but ultimately for herself. She’d chosen someone she felt was her superior in order to prove her lack
of self-worth and was re-enacting a miserable childhood in which she was always ignored in favour of (and also by) a golden brother.
[6]   But now what? I’ve often heard anti-therapy types complain that therapists turn couples against each other, that if one party is in therapy the marriage
is doomed. I suspect this is often true—an unhappy person is often unhappy specifically in their relationship. But this relationship was based purely on
fantasy. My patient had ludicrously idealised an ordinary guy and he liked it (as it fed his narcissism). She was unable to know the real person, seeing only
the glittering fantasy that revealed her own worthlessness. Once she’d recovered her reality-testing, withdrawn her colossal projections of perfection into
him, and was more able to see the world as it is, the rose-coloured veil slipped away and she is left with a man as flawed as any other: as flawed as herself.
[7]   Since she didn’t choose him clear-sightedly, she didn’t choose him at all. She chose a fantasy. Though reality has allowed her to accept herself, she’s
now going to have to accept or reject him, without the auriferous sheen [brilho].
Adapted from Prospect, June 2017.